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Our goal in this paper is to shed new light on the dynamics of local government policymaking, with speci¯c
reference to the ¯scal policies of municipal governments in the United States. The U.S. federal system,
of which local governments are an important part, is a durable institutional structure which decentralizes
signi¯cant portions of public-sector decisionmaking authority to subnational governments. Governments
at all levels within this structure operate under a variety of constraints, and these constraints create the
incentives that, in part, elicit the observed behavior of policymakers. The ¯scal policies of subnational
governments are important in themselves, but they also illuminate the nature of the constraints which
these governments face and thus the institutional structure of the public sector itself.
Local governments in the U.S. are numerous, diverse, and economically important.1 The services per-
formed by these governments, their ¯nancing, and their relationships with the national and state govern-
ments have evolved over time in a complex process involving the interplay of all branches of government
(executive, legislative, and judicial) at all levels of government (federal, state, and local), all against the
background of ongoing demographic, technological, economic, and social change and widely-varying local
circumstances.
Occasionally { but rarely, in U.S. experience { local ¯scal policies result in crises in which a government's
¯nancial obligations to creditors, vendors, and employees cannot be met from existing revenues. In such
situations, local authorities, as units of government subordinate to states, are often subjected to special
oversight mechanisms even as the state government assists the locality with additional funding to meet its
most pressing contractual and public-service delivery obligations. The ¯nancial crises of New York City
in the 1970s and of Philadelphia, Orange County, California, and Washington DC in the 1990s provide
well-known examples of local ¯scal policies gone awry, and smaller localities also encounter ¯scal distress
1The Bureau of the Census publishes a quinquennial Census of Governments. As of the 1997 census, there were over
3,000 counties, almost 20,000 municipalities, almost 35,000 special districts, almost 14,000 school districts, and almost 17,000
townships, making almost 90,000 units of local government in total. Total public expenditure by all localities amounted
to $837 billion, of which municipalities { the focus of the present analysis { accounted for $275B, school districts $257B,
counties $198B, special districts $89B, and townships $28B. Total local government spending in 1997 amounted to some 10.1
% of GDP. In 1995 local government spending amounted to 26.9 % of all public expenditures in the US.from time to time.2 These events, though noteworthy, are nonetheless exceptions to the rule. Somehow,
despite (or perhaps in part because of) the con°icting demands imposed upon them by taxpayers, interest
groups, creditors, vendors, state governments, and others, local policymakers face an incentive structure
that, in equilibrium, results in behavior that for the most part preserves the ¯nancial integrity of local
governments. Whether the ¯scal policies chosen by local governments are economically desirable according
to normative criteria (e±ciency, equity) is a separate and very important question. Leaving this question
aside, one can observe that the institutional structure of American federalism has created a system of
local governments that pass a basic survival test while permitting a relatively high degree of local ¯scal
autonomy { a fundamental requirement for any ¯scally-decentralized public sector.
Since ¯scal viability cannot be taken for granted at all times and places, it is a matter of some importance
to understand better how these governments manage the ¯nancial stresses to which they are inevitably
exposed. Our analysis is intended to shed new light, from an empirical viewpoint, on the dynamics of
municipal ¯scal adjustment. Quantitatively speaking, how do municipal governments adjust their revenues,
expenditures, and debt policies over time? What role do transfers from higher-level governments play in
their ¯scal dynamics? U.S. municipal governments present an exceptionally attractive subject for the
systematic empirical analysis of decentralized ¯scal policies. We have assembled a balanced panel of
annual ¯scal data for more than 1000 municipalities for over a quarter-century. These data have been
collected using consistent de¯nitions and, though they are of course subject to imperfections, they likely
represent the best available collection of ¯scal data on such a large number of governmental units.3
2See GAO (1995) for series of case studies of localities in ¯scal distress, some ¯ndings of which are summarized in Holloway
(1996a, 1996b). The infrequency of formal municipal bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. is quite remarkable. Since the
passage of the Municipal Bankruptcy Act in 1937, there have been fewer than 500 bankruptcy ¯lings. Municipal bankruptcies
are a minuscule fraction of all bankruptcies. Of the total of 1.2 million bankruptcy proceedings commenced in the 12 months
preceding Sept. 30, 2000, 6 were ¯led under Chapter 9 (the portion of the bankruptcy code governing municipalities). A
large portion of Chapter 9 ¯lings that do occur are accounted for by small special districts (such as water or sewer districts),
and bankruptcies by municipalities proper are therefore even more rare. See Administrative O±ce of the US Courts (2000a,
b, Table F-2)) and National Bankruptcy Review Commission (1997).
3Numerous studies have examined ¯scal policymaking at the level of state governments; see, for example, Poterba (1994),
Bohn and Inman (1996), and McCarty and Schmidt (1997). At the municipal level, data on large municipalities are more
readily available and have been a principal subject of previous analyses; see, e.g., Inman (1989). An exception is Holtz-Eakin
et al.(1991) which use a sample of 171 municipalities drawn randomly from the Census of Governments. Large municipalities
are clearly of great importance because they account for a large fraction of total municipal ¯scal activity, but, as we shall
see below, their behavior di®ers in signi¯cant ways from that of smaller cities.
2Our analysis utilizes methods that have been exploited previously in macroeconomic analyses devoted to
the study of intertemporal government budget constraints for national governments (e.g., Wilcox, 1989,
Trehan and Walsh, 1991). Previous studies have generally focused on testing for the stationarity or
\sustainability" of ¯scal policies; by contrast, we pay closer attention to the adjustment process that
maintains this balance. Suppose, for example, that municipal revenue declines, such that the local de¯cit
is increased. Long-run budget balance requires some o®setting adjustment to this increased de¯cit. What
form does this adjustment take, and when does it occur? Do municipalities with low revenue tend to
reduce spending in order to restore balance? Do they simply run bigger de¯cits for a period of time,
delaying adjustments in taxes and spending? Do lower revenues trigger additional transfers from higher-
level governments, enabling municipalities to maintain spending without having to raise local taxes? Or is
lower revenue in one period simply o®set in subsequent periods, reducing the need for further adjustment?
Any of these types of ¯scal adjustment, or some combination of all of them, is conceivable, and the same
can be said about possible paths of ¯scal adjustment in response to ¯scal imbalances due to innovations
in grants, spending, or debt service.
Given the complexity of the political and market constraints under which municipal authorities operate, it
is di±cult to justify strong prior expectations about which particular form of adjustment must dominate,
and our goal here is to examine the dynamics of ¯scal adjustment with a minimum of prior structure. We
do this using a vector error-correction approach, outlined in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data and
estimation approach, and provides speci¯cation tests as well as further background information about the
interpretation of the basic model. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis, using the entire
sample. These results indicate that municipalities respond di®erently to ¯scal imbalances originating from
di®erent sources. As an illustration, we ¯nd that higher municipal public spending is typically followed by
o®setting expenditure changes in subsequent periods, with relatively modest adjustments in other ¯scal
variables; by contrast, imbalances associated with municipal revenue tend to persist and to be followed
by substantial changes in municipal spending.
For reasons of institutional structure and political economy, the incentives for ¯scal adjustment may dif-
fer signi¯cantly across municipalities, in particular, between large and small cities. Because our sample
3contains a large cross-section of municipalities, it is possible to analyze sub-samples with di®erences in
population size separately, as is done in Section 5. We ¯nd, in fact, that the basic pattern of ¯scal adjust-
ment is robust across cities of di®erent sizes, but intergovernmental grants play a much more pronounced
role in maintaining budget balance for large cities.
Section 6 summarizes the main ¯ndings and discusses some of the many directions for interesting future
research that they suggest.
2 A Framework for Analysis of Fiscal Adjustment
In order to examine the process of budgetary adjustment with a minimum of prior restrictions, we analyze
the evolution of ¯scal °ows like revenues, expenditures, and debt service, as well as their interrelationship
over time, by means of a vector autoregression. Although ¯scal adjustments might in principle take
place at any future date, a now-standard approach in macroeconomic analysis is to ¯t a time-series
model that captures the most signi¯cant interrelationships between the variables with a limited number
of lags. If municipalities, on average, pursue ¯scal policies consistent with intertemporal budget balance,
the components of their budgets will display a cointegrating relationship, and, hence, the de¯cit will be
stationary (e.g., Trehan and Walsh, 1988). In order to model the dynamic adjustment to changes current
in ¯scal imbalances, one can exploit this stochastic implication of the intertemporal budget constraint
and employ a vector error-correction framework, relating the change of expenditures, revenues, and debt
service to the lagged de¯cit. Bohn (1991), for example, conducts such an analysis of ¯scal policy at
the level of the US Federal government, and we utilize a similar approach at the city level. Unlike macro
models applied to national governments, however, it is necessary to recognize that local governments obtain
substantial amounts of revenue not only from own-sources like taxes, but from higher levels of government;
in our sample, about 28% of municipal revenue, on average, is obtained from intergovernmental transfers.
Furthermore, as already pointed out in the introduction, those transfers may be crucial in restoring the
balance of the budget. We therefore explicitly decompose the revenue side of the budget into own-source
and intergovernmental revenue.
4Formally, the empirical analysis focuses on a four-dimensional vector of budgetary components Yt =
(Gt;DSt;Rt;Zt)0, where Gt is \primary" government expenditure, DSt denotes current debt service ex-
penditures, Rt is own-source revenue, and Zt is intergovernmental revenue. The current de¯cit Dt is
de¯ned as
Dt ´ bYt = Gt + DSt ¡ Rt ¡ Zt; with b = (1;1;¡1;¡1): (1)
Following the literature, the empirical model assumes that the current de¯cit is stationary, and describes
the changes of the elements of the vector Yt as a function of lagged changes of Yt as well as of its lagged
level, i.e. the lagged de¯cit
A(L)¢Yt = ° bYt¡1 + ut; (2)
where ¢ is the di®erence operator and A(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator. The lagged de¯cit term
captures the error-correction property of the system, implying that de¯cits or surpluses lead to budgetary
adjustments re°ected in ¢Yt; the parameter vector ° describes the magnitude (and sign) of the impact
of the previous year's de¯cit on the current changes in the budget components and thus the speed of the
error-correction process. This approach can be utilized only if the de¯cit is stationary, which must be
veri¯ed empirically. It does not, however, impose any a priori restrictions on the direction or magnitude
of the adjustments of individual budget components; instead, by estimating these adjustments empirically,
the analysis yields insights about how each of the components of the ¯scal policy vector Yt reacts, over
time, to innovations in itself or in one of the other components.
As in a vector autoregressive system, dynamic adjustments to de¯cit shocks can be described by impulse-
response functions. More speci¯cally, the system can be used to trace the ¯scal adjustment to temporary
imbalances, i.e. to surpluses or de¯cits, which cannot be traced back statistically to previous changes in
the budget components.4 Graphs of impulse-response functions o®er visual displays showing the time-
paths of budgetary adjustment for ¯scal variables (see Buettner and Wildasin (2003)). To summarize the
¯scal adjustment process in a more compact and quantitative fashion, one can compute the present value
4Note that these temporary imbalances are not \structural" shocks in the terminology of standard VAR analysis, because
a deviation in any one budget component may be accompanied by an immediate adjustment in other budget components.
5of the response of each variable with respect to shocks in every other variable.
Following Bohn (1991) we can state the intertemporal budget constraint in terms of innovations as (see
Buettner and Wildasin (2003) for details)
d PV t (¢R) + d PV t (¢Z) ¡ d PV t (¢G) = b Gt + d DSt ¡ b Rt ¡ b Zt; (3)
where b Xt denotes the innovation in a variable Xt, i.e., the change in its expected value. d PV t (¢X) is the
expected present value of all changes in this variable in the future. Accordingly, the innovations in the
budgetary components on the right-hand side should evoke an o®setting linear combination of innovations
in the present value of the responses.
More speci¯cally, based on an estimate of system (2), we can compute the present value of the projected
changes of each budgetary component in response to innovations in itself and in any other budgetary
component. Let ¼ (Y [i];Y [j]) denote the present value of the impulse-response function of variable Y [j]
given a unit innovation in variable Y [i]. Following equation (3) a unit innovation in each of the budgetary
components triggers o®setting responses of the components of the primary surplus such that
¼ (Y [i];R) + ¼ (Y [i];Z) ¡ ¼ (Y [i];G) = b[i]; (4)
where b[i] is the i-th component of b de¯ned in (1).
Since equation (4) follows from the de¯nition of the intertemporal budget constraint, one might think of
it as an exact relationship. However, aside from possible inconsistencies in the data, this is not necessarily
the case, empirically. Whereas the underlying intertemporal budget constraint assumes a given interest
rate to discount future budgetary °ows, the interest rate is generally not known with certainty, and it may
also vary over time. In addition, as discussed further below, the data display signi¯cant variation in the
size of municipalities, which requires scaling ¯scal variables in per-capita terms. As a consequence, the
appropriate discount rate is a function of both the interest rate as well as the rate of population growth
and, hence, di®ers from the interest rate (see Buettner and Wildasin (2003) for details). Finally, it is
6possible that intertemporal budget balance, in practice, is achieved over much longer time periods than
the roughly 25-year horizon of our data, and hence could not be detected in a model with a lag structure
of only a few years. For all of these reasons, the intertemporal budget constraint, applied to the available
data, does not hold as an accounting identity within the context of our empirical model. Despite these
quali¯cations, we shall see that the adjustment pattern found in the present study follows the predictions
of equations (3) and (4) rather closely.
3 Data and Model Speci¯cation
The empirical analysis employs annual data for individual municipalities from all over the U.S. obtained
from the quinquennial Census of Governments (COG) and the accompanying Annual Survey of Govern-
ment Finances (ASOGF). In order to trace budgetary adjustments across time the analysis focuses on a
subsample of all cities annually reported in the COG/ASOGF, yielding a balanced panel for 1270 cities
over 26 years from 1972 to 1997 for a total of 33,020 city-year observations.5 The dataset comprises four
¯scal variables, which are constructed from Bureau of Census ¯scal classi¯cations as shown in Table 1.
There are two revenue variables, own-source revenue and intergovernmental revenue (\grants") obtained
from higher-level governments. There are also two variables on the expenditure side, general expenditure
and net debt-service expenditures. In addition to ¯scal transfers from higher-level governments, small
amounts of municipal expenditures and revenues are payments to or receipts from other local govern-
ments; the net amount of these payments is included as part of general expenditure. Many municipalities
hold signi¯cant interest-bearing ¯nancial assets, but, since asset values are not always reported in the
data, it is not possible to determine net indebtedness. It is therefore preferable to utilize the °ow of net
debt service.
5Although the data are available in digital form, their preparation for analysis is non-trivial, particularly because they are
not coded uniformly across years. The ¯nal data have been checked for consistency with state-level aggregates reported in
Census publications. The Census Bureau makes occasional revisions in these data without, however, updating the publicly-
available data. Since the revisions by the Census Bureau are not reported, preliminary regressions have been run to detect
in°uential observations. If a further inspection of these observations revealed apparent inconsistencies with previous and
subsequent observations, the corresponding city was completely removed from the dataset. As a result, 76 cities were removed
from the 1346 cities in the basic balanced sample.
7Table 1: De¯nition of Fiscal Variables
Variable Components (Bureau of Census categories)
(i) Own Revenue (Rt) Total Taxes, Total General Charges,
Total Miscellaneous General Revenue
excluding Interest Revenue.
(ii) Grants (Zt) Intergovernmental Revenue
from Federal Government
and from State Governments
(iii) General Expenditure (Gt) Total General Expenditure
including Intergovernmental Expenditure
net of Local Intergovernmental Revenue,
and excluding Interest on General Debt.
(iv) Debt Service (DSt) Total Interest on General Debt
net of Interest Revenue
(v) General De¯cit (Dt) (iii) + (iv) - (i) - (ii)
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics with ¯scal variables scaled in terms of population size. The
mean of real per-capita expenditures is $756. There is, however, strong variation in expenditures, with
a standard deviation of $534. The debt service, de¯ned net of interest earnings, shows a mean around
zero. The ¯gures for expenditure correspond to the mean values on the revenue side, i.e. own revenue of
$553 and intergovernmental revenues of $213. The mean of the residual di®erence between the ¯rst four
components (denoted as general government de¯cit) is at minus $8, indicating that on average the cities
run a small surplus. However, there is marked variation in the sample between a per capita de¯cit of as
much as $2,464 and a surplus of $1,771. This variation in budget outcomes is also re°ected in di®erences
in the debt service, where some cities show high spending whereas others actually report positive net
interest earnings. The ¯scal variables show modest mean values of annual growth in expenditures and
revenues, and again substantial variation between rather large extremes.
The bottom of Table 2 reports statistics for population and income showing that the average population
size is around 75,000. Population size ranges from below 1,000 to almost 8 million (New York City)
indicating strong variation in the dataset.6 Thus, to model the ¯scal adjustment process, ¯scal variables
should be scaled with the size of the considered jurisdiction; since income data are only available at the
6The population data reported in the COG/ASOGF public use ¯les do not correspond strictly to the year of the ¯scal
data. In addition, they are generally not updated on an annual basis. Therefore, the population data have been smoothed
by a moving average using a cubic trend polynomial (Kendall and Stuart, 1976:381f).
8Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Median
Fiscal variables Levels per capita, 1972-1997
Own Revenue 0.553 0.399 0.004 7.501 0.445
General Expenditure 0.756 0.534 0.005 7.826 0.596
Grants 0.213 0.233 0.000 3.150 0.136
Debt Service (net) 0.002 0.051 -0.530 1.104 -0.000
General De¯cit -0.008 0.164 -1.771 2.464 -0.018
Annual change per capita, 1973-1997
Own Revenue 0.014 0.102 -1.441 1.486 0.009
General Expenditure 0.017 0.191 -2.348 2.485 0.011
Grants 0.004 0.104 -1.412 1.610 0.000
Debt Service (net) -0.001 0.032 -0.527 0.463 -0.001
Other variables 1972-1997
Income in $10,000 per capita 1.920 0.516 0.722 6.737 1.838
Population (in 1,000) 74.77 267.1 0.671 7922 31.38
Statistics for pooled observations for 1270 cities in 1996 dollars (de°ated with common US GDP de°ator). Fiscal variables
in $ 1,000 per-capita.
county level the analysis utilizes per-capita ¯gures.7 However, variations in absolute population size are
used in Section 5 to decompose the sample in order to determine whether there are important di®erences
in the budgetary adjustment pattern in large and small cities.
Estimation of the system outlined in Section 2 is basically carried out by means of regressions of the
annual changes in each of the budgetary components, i.e. in own revenue, grants, general expenditures,
and in debt service, on the de¯cit in the previous year and on lagged values of the changes in each of the
budget components, such that the basic set of estimation equations is:












































































7The income ¯gures report per-capita income for the corresponding county or county area as reported by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
9Table 3: Speci¯cation Tests
lag length 2 3 4
indiv.e® (Â2 (5076)) 4019 4186 4437
lag order reduction (Â2 (16)) 1518 711.0 571.7
Likelihood ratio statistics on cross-equation restrictions.
Note that the basic system is formulated in ¯rst di®erences to take account of possible non-stationarity
of the individual budgetary components.8
Estimation of the VECM (2) requires speci¯cation of the lag length. Given the limited overall time
dimension of the dataset (26 years), we begin with a lag of 4 years in the di®erenced data, subsequently
testing for possible reductions in the number of lags. As shown in Table 3, a reduction of the lag length
is always rejected. This suggests employing a model with four lags.9
Typically, panel data studies allow for individual e®ects capturing di®erences in the characteristics of
individual units.10 The following analysis deals essentially with ¯rst di®erences of ¯scal °ow variables,
and, in this respect, will not be a®ected by cross-sectional di®erences in local characteristics. The ¯scal
de¯cit variable, however, is entered in levels. The presence of individual e®ects would imply that the
jurisdictions converge to di®erent (per-capita) de¯cit levels. Comparing estimation with and without
individual e®ects it turns out that joint tests reject the presence of individual e®ects, regardless of lag
lengths (see Table 3).11 This indicates that cities are commonly converging toward the same level of
de¯cit. As no indication of individual e®ects is found, it is appropriate to estimate individual equations
of the system (2) separately with OLS; in this case, joint estimation does not improve e±ciency as the set
8Unit root tests have been carried out using a statistic suggested by Im et al. (2002). As expected, non-stationarity of
the levels cannot be rejected, but stationarity is not rejected for the de¯cit and for the ¯rst di®erences of all of the four
budgetary components (details presented in Buettner and Wildasin (2003)).
9Estimates of models with 5 and 6 lags (available upon request) did not show major di®erences in the adjustment pattern.
10The literature on dynamic panel data has emphasized biasedness of standard panel data approaches in the presence of
lagged endogenous variables and suggests the use of instrumental techniques (e.g., Holtz-Eakin et al., 1991). With the rather
long time period available in our sample, the Nickell (1981) bias should not be a signi¯cant problem, and it is neglected in
the tests for the presence of individual e®ects.
11Testing is carried out using individual ¯xed e®ects for all equations since Hausman tests rejected the use of a random
e®ects model for the own-source revenue and expenditure equations.
10Table 4: Estimates for the Error-Correction Term
Equation ° (Std.err.)
Own Revenue :098 (.013)
Gen. Expend. ¡:297 (.018)
Debt Service :013 (.003)
Vert. Grants :069 (.009)
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
of regressors is the same across equations.12
4 Empirical Results
Since the system is a four-dimensional vector error-correction model, estimation produces a large number of
parameters. Central parameters are the coe±cients of the error-correction term in the individual equations.
As shown in Table 4, the results clearly con¯rm convergence toward the intertemporal budget constraint,
since a higher de¯cit shows a positive impact on own revenue and on grants received, whereas a higher
de¯cit shows a negative impact on expenditures. The positive impact on debt service is consistent with the
fact that the de¯cit results in a rise in debt levels and thus creates higher debt service in the subsequent
period. Given a constant rate of interest, and in the absence of population growth, the coe±cient of the
de¯cit in the debt service equation should re°ect the real interest rate.13
One way to trace the estimated adjustment pattern resulting from the complete model is to compute
impulse-response functions showing how the necessary adjustment actually takes place given an initial
¯scal disturbance. The proper interpretation is that the impulse-responses trace the adjustment to a ¯scal
imbalance hypothetically arising from changes in the individual budget components. Later, we discuss
12Avery (1977) has emphasized that in the presence of individual error components, estimation of individual equations
separately is not e±cient and proposed simultaneous estimation techniques (see, also, Baltagi, 1995:103pp).
13With a constant rate of interest r, and denoting the rate of change in population with n, the change in debt service






















As population growth shows an average rate of 0.98 % in the sample, the impact of a change in debt per capita on the
debt service is less than proportional to the real interest rate (Even with a constant interest rate this relationship is only an
approximate one, because of the di±culty of measuring government assets and liabilities).
11the possible sources of these imbalances.
A convenient way to summarize the impulse responses is to calculate the total response to temporary
imbalances in present-value terms, as outlined in Section 2.14 In order to calculate the present values, we
¯x the discount rate at 3 %.15 The columns of Table 5 show the long-run response given unit innovations in
per-capita values of the ¯scal variables, expressed in present-value terms. The table also displays standard
errors obtained by sampling from the normal joint distribution of the VECM estimates and computing the
corresponding distribution in the impulse-response functions as suggested by Sims (1987) and Hamilton
(1994:337).16
It is instructive to consider the ¯ndings reported in Table 5 from two di®erent perspectives. Reading
down the columns of the table shows how innovations in any one ¯scal variable a®ect the subsequent
adjustments of itself and the other variables. Reading across the row for any one ¯scal variable shows how
responsive it is to changes in its own value or in that of other ¯scal variables.
Consider ¯rst the own-revenue column. This column shows how a $1 increase or decrease in revenues in
one period a®ects the subsequent evolution of expenditures, intergovernmental transfers, debt service, and
revenues themselves, all expressed in present-value terms. To illustrate, suppose that revenues increase
by $1 resulting in a current de¯cit reduction (or current surplus increase) of $1, What kind of subsequent
¯scal adjustment can we predict on basis of our statistical model? The revenue column shows that an
innovation to own revenue by $1 is followed by an increase in future expenditures by 51 cents and to
reductions of own revenue and grants of 35 and 9 cents respectively, all measured in present value terms.
Since part of the adjustment to a change in each of the ¯scal variables takes the form of an o®setting
change in its own future value, it is also instructive to assess the response to a permanent $1 increase in
each variable. Dividing by the permanent component of the innovation in own revenue (1¡:348), it turns
14The precise time-path of adjustment can be illustrated graphically by plotting impulse-response functions (Buettner and
Wildasin (2003)).
15Probably due to the fact that most of the adjustment takes place in the ¯rst periods, the qualitative results are not
sensitive to the actual value of the discount rate.
16Sims (1987) argues that a possible de¯ciency of this approach is that it ignores the randomness of the estimated covariance
matrix of the errors. However, in the current context, this estimate is obtained from a large cross-section as in seemingly
unrelated regression analysis. Note that the sampling is carried out using a heteroscedasticity consistent estimate of the
variance-covariance matrix of the VECM.
12Table 5: Present Value Responses
Response Innovation to
Own Revenue Gen. Expend. Grants Debt Service
Own Revenue -.348 (.026) .162 (.019) -.144 (.023) .145 (.037)
Gen. Expend. .508 (.027) -.716 (.020) .338 (.027) -.370 (.037)
Grants -.086 (.012) .082 (.010) -.473 (.017) .049 (.016)
Debt Service -.005 (.005) .019 (.004) -.015 (.004) -.387 (.014)
response to permanent increase
Own Revenue .571 (.040) -.273 (.044) .236 (.059)
Gen. Expend. .780 (.021) .641 (.043) -.604 (.063)
Grants -.131 (.019) .287 (.033) .079 (.026)
Debt Service -.008 (.008) .068 (.014) -.028 (.008)
Standard errors in parentheses obtained by sampling from the normal joint distribution of the VECM estimates based on a
heteroscedasticity consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix.
out that 78 cents of a permanent increase in own revenue by $ 1 is translated into higher spending (cf. the
bottom panel of Table 5), whereas intergovernmental grants are reduced by 13 cents.
Following the predictions of equation (4), the innovations in each of the budgetary components will be
fully balanced by the present value of changes in own revenue, grants, and expenditures, which make up
the primary surplus. For example, summing across the ¯rst three rows in the ¯rst column, an additional
dollar of own revenue is estimated to result in an o®setting change of 94 cents in the primary surplus.
Computing the present value of adjustments in the primary surplus to innovations in expenditures and
grants yields similar ¯gures of $ 0.959 and $ 0.955, respectively. For innovations in debt service, the
sum of the present value of changes in expenditures, revenues, and grants is much lower ($ 0.564). But,
future changes in the debt service play a major role in balancing the budget, indicating strong temporal
°uctuations in the debt service. With regard to permanent increases in the debt service by $ 1, the present
value response of the primary surplus amounts to $ 0.919. Given that the intertemporal budget constraint
holds only approximately in empirical data, as the true interest rate, its time path, and the amount of
non-interest bearing assets of the municipalities are not known, these ¯gures are indicative of reasonable
properties of the empirical model of municipal ¯scal adjustment.
13But the results also indicate that jurisdictions do not respond solely with the components of their primary
surplus to innovations in budgetary components. A small but statistically signi¯cant fraction of additional
grants, 2.8 cents out of a permanent increase of $1, is used to lower the debt burden. In addition, an
increase in expenditures is followed by an increase in debt service by 6.8 cents per dollar of additional
permanent expenditures.
Generally, the results show that innovations in the components of the budget tend to be partly o®set
by future changes in the same component. This is particularly true for expenditures, where more than
two thirds of a change are balanced with an o®setting change in the present value of future expenditures.
Considering permanent innovations in budgetary components, Table 5 displays a key role of expenditures
for ¯scal adjustment, where we ¯nd that three quarters of each dollar in additional own revenue and
almost two thirds of each dollar in additional grants show up in the form of added spending. Changes in
debt service also have much larger e®ects on expenditures than on own revenue. Nevertheless, smaller but
still signi¯cant parts of the adjustment are obtained by changes in own revenue and grants, in the sense
that lower revenues and higher expenses are balanced with signi¯cant future increases in own revenue as
well as grants.17
So much for the interpretation of the columns of Table 5. Next, reading across the rows in Table 5, one can
see that each ¯scal variable adjusts in the expected direction to innovations in the others, but by varying
degrees. Own revenue, for example, adjusts more strongly to an innovation in expenditures than to an
innovation in grants or debt service. The third row, showing the response of grants, is of particular interest.
Many theoretical and empirical studies highlight the role of intergovernmental transfers as instruments
through which higher level governments can in°uence the behavior of recipient governments. However,
as recent discussions of soft-budget constraints have emphasized it may also be the case that recipient
governments can induce higher ¯scal transfers from donor governments through their own policy actions.
The third row of the table shows that ¯scal transfers from higher-level governments do indeed respond
17It may be of interest to relate the response to an innovation in grants to the discussion of the \°ypaper" e®ect, according
to which the public sector has a high propensity to spend out of grants is (for overviews see Gramlich, 1977, and Hines and
Thaler, 1997). The results in Table 5 indicate that the response in spending to a permanent increase in grants by one dollar
amounts to 64 cents, which generally is in accordance with the results in the literature (see Hines and Thaler, 1997). This
result di®ers, however, from Holtz-Eakin et al. (1991) who use a panel VAR (with only large municipalities) to estimate the
relationship between the levels of ¯scal variables, and do not ¯nd a positive e®ect of an innovation in grants on spending.
14Table 6: Signi¯cance of Conditioning Variables
Equations
Conditioning Variables Own Reven. Gen.Expend. Grants Debt Serv.
Period-speci¯c e®ects 399(20) ? 346(20) ? 581(20) ? 970(20)?
Predicted change in tax revenuea 292 (1) ? 45.3 (1) ? 1.06 (1) 0.05 (1)
Predicted change in fed. grantsa 0.38 (1) 14.9 (1) ? 117 (1) ? 0.82 (1)
Change in employmenta 0.01 (1) 0.34 (1) 1.68 (1) 0.61 (1)
Change in incomea 8.56 (1) ? 2.49 (1) 4.54 (1) ? 3.69 (1)
Likelihood-ratio statistics for restricting the respective set of conditioning variables to zero. a Period-speci¯c e®ects included
as further conditioning variables. Signi¯cance at the 5 % level is marked with a star, degrees of freedom in parentheses.
quite signi¯cantly to innovations in municipal own revenues and expenditures, but not very strongly to
debt service burdens.
The results in Table 5 provide a picture of a coherent ¯scal adjustment mechanism, showing how cities
adapt, in accordance with the constraint of long-run ¯scal balances, to unpredicted changes in key ¯scal
variables. Our analysis has left open, however, what the sources of these unpredicted changes actually
are. Indeed, each such change might itself be the result of underlying exogenous shocks to local economic
conditions, macroeconomic conditions, or any number of other factors. In order to clarify the sources
of shocks to municipal ¯scal variables, we include some additional conditioning variables in our basic
model. Table 6 reports likelihood-ratio statistics, which provide a natural way to summarize the gain in
the predictive power from the inclusion of additional variables.18 In the ¯rst row of Table 6 we report
statistics for the inclusion period-speci¯c e®ects. The e®ects would include macroeconomic conditions
such as GDP growth, unemployment, and ¯nancial market conditions such as interest rates.19 We see
that period-speci¯c e®ects do partly account for the unpredicted changes in ¯scal variables to which
municipalities must adjust; this is especially true for the debt-service equation, probably indicating the
importance of °uctuations in interest rates as determinants of municipal borrowing costs.
18More precisely, the likelihood-ratio statistics indicate whether implicit restrictions in the basic, unconditional model can
be rejected on statistical grounds.
19Note that we do not use period-speci¯c e®ects in the basic equation, as this would imply to model only adjustments to
idiosyncratic innovations, although the intertemporal budget constraint requires adjustments to all innovations. Moreover,
the inclusion of period-speci¯c e®ects would tend to limit the comparability between the results for di®erent subsamples as
carried out below.
15As we have seen, municipal own source and intergovernmental revenues trigger signi¯cant adjustments
in municipal ¯nances. There may be also common factors that a®ect the evolution of revenues for all
municipalities nationwide and that are thus exogenous to individual cities. These nationwide trends will
a®ect individual municipalities di®erently, depending on their individual revenue structures and, thus, act
as exogenous ¯scal shocks. To examine the relationship with the ¯scal imbalances empirically, we use
detailed data on the budget structure in order to compute averages of annual nationwide trends in the
components of tax revenue and federal grants, weighted by the speci¯c share in tax revenue or federal
grants received by the individual municipality. Inclusion of these variables enables us to determine the
extent to which nationwide trends in these subcategories of the budget account for contemporaneous
innovations in municipal budget.20
As shown in Table 6, the national trends in municipal tax revenues have a large impact on the own-
source revenues of individual cities; additionally, they have a signi¯cant though more modest impact on
expenditures. It is notable that it has no signi¯cant e®ect on grants or municipal debt service. Similarly,
the national trends in federal grants have a large impact on municipal grant revenues, but no strong e®ects
on other municipal ¯scal variables. These results indicate that national trends in tax revenues and federal
grants are reasonable proximate determinants of innovations in the revenues of the individual cities. As
we have seen in Table 5 these innovations have large and persistent e®ects on all components of municipal
budgets; common national trends in individual revenue components thus emerge as important shocks,
exogenous to individual cities, to which municipal ¯nances must adjust.
One might also expect that local ¯scal imbalances, including innovations in local revenues, depend impor-
tantly on local economic and demographic conditions (in addition to other possible idiosyncratic factors).
To investigate this possibility, we use county-level data on the change of employment and personal in-
20If ¢Xi;t denotes the annual change in one of the budgetary components, its prediction can be obtained as a weighted
average of the national trends in each of the sub-categories of the COG/ASOGF data making up the budget components,











i;t¡1 is the share of sub-category j in the respective budget component in municipality i and ¢X
j
t is the national
per-capita change in component j. The predicted change in tax revenue is an average of national trends in each of the 18
di®erent types of taxes reported in the data. The predicted change in federal grants distinguishes 12 sub-groups.
16come, both in per-capita terms.21 As shown in the last two rows of Table 6, these variables have only weak
predictive power; in fact, changes in employment demonstrate no signi¯cant e®ect at all. For changes in
income we ¯nd some limited though signi¯cant e®ects on municipal revenues.
To summarize, the analysis shows that imbalances in municipal revenue, whether own-source or intergov-
ernmental, trigger signi¯cant adjustments in all components of municipal budgets, and that these imbal-
ances are importantly in°uenced by common national trends, exogenous to individual cities. Somewhat
surprisingly, shocks to local economic variables have only small impacts on municipal ¯scal imbalances.
5 Fiscal Adjustment and City Size
Our analysis so far has imposed the assumption that all U.S. municipalities follow a common ¯scal adjust-
ment process, and, indeed, the empirical ¯ndings of Section 4 lend support to this view. The institutional
environments within which di®erent cities choose their ¯scal policies are not necessarily all the same, how-
ever. For example, large cities, which have been the focus of most previous studies of municipal ¯nances,
may face quite di®erent administrative and political constraints than smaller ones. On the one hand,
they may be able, e®ectively, to lobby higher-level governments for ¯scal assistance or other special treat-
ment. On the other hand, all states distinguish cities into size classes for purposes of state statutes and
administrative regulations concerning ¯scal policies, personnel management and sta±ng rules, ¯nancial
accounting and management procedures, and other controls.22 Since municipalities of di®erent sizes may
thus operate in quite di®erent, ¯scal, political, and regulatory regimes, it is natural to wonder to what
extent our estimates of ¯scal adjustment parameters are robust with regard to city size.
21The data has been taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
22Cities of the \¯rst class", for example, are those with the largest populations, the next size category de¯nes the cities of
the \second class", and so forth. The preamble to the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority Act for Cities
of the First Class, a law which set up elaborate ¯nancing (a \bailout") and ¯scal control mechanisms for Philadelphia during
its ¯scal crisis in the 1990s, exempli¯es the potential importance of city size: \It is hereby declared to be a public policy
of the Commonwealth ... to foster the ¯scal integrity of cities of the ¯rst class to assure that these cities provide for the
health, safety, and welfare of their citizens; pay principal and interest owed on their debt obligations when due; meet ¯nancial
obligations to their employees, vendors, and suppliers; and provide for proper ¯nancial planning procedures and budgeting
practices." \Cities of the ¯rst class" in Pennsylvania are those with populations in excess of 1.5 million. Philadelphia is the
only city in this class; the second largest city in the state is Pittsburgh, with a population of less than .4 million.
17Table 7: Decomposition with Respect to City Size
Response Innovation to
Own Revenue Gen. Expend. Vert. Grants Debt Service
small cities (bottom 25%)
Own Revenue -.420 (.047) .204 (.040) -.188 (.049) .306 (.082)
Gen. Expend. .443 (.049) -.696 (.039) .262 (.051) -.319 (.084)
Vert. Grants -.075 (.023) .056 (.018) -.502 (.029) -.018 (.034)
Debt Service -.002 (.008) .015 (.006) -.012 (.007) -.337 (.027)
response to permanent increase
Own Revenue .673 (.070) -.378 (.097) .462 (.117)
Gen. Expend. .765 (.044) .525 (.094) -.482 (.129)
Vert. Grants -.130 (.040) .184 (.059) -.027 (.051)
Debt Service -.004 (.014) .050 (.020) -.025 (.014)
large cities (top 75%)
Own Revenue -.320 (.062) .115 (.031) -.132 (.039) .058 (.079)
Gen. Expend. .511 (.069) -.696 (.039) .404 (.057) -.298 (.084)
Vert. Grants -.112 (.026) .148 (.023) -.424 (.040) .180 (.037)
Debt Service -.014 (.010) .029 (.007) -.033 (.008) -.408 (.025)
response to permanent increase
Own Revenue .380 (.075) -.230 (.071) .098 (.132)
Gen. Expend. .752 (.048) .702 (.069) -.503 (.144)
Vert. Grants -.165 (.044) .487 (.060) .304 (.063)
Debt Service -.021 (.015) .096 (.026) -.057 (.015)
Sample decomposition based on the quartiles of the long-run distribution of population. Small cities have populations between
1 and 15 thousand, while large cities have populations between 63 thousand and 7.4 millions. Standard errors in parentheses
obtained by sampling from the normal joint distribution of the VECM estimates based on a heteroscedasticity-consistent
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix.
Results from estimating the system separately for large and small cities are reported in Table 7. (Results
for cities in the 25th to 75th percentiles by population size are omitted to save space, but are generally
in accordance with those reported for the entire sample.) With regard to the innovations on the revenue
side the results are generally similar to those above. An innovation in own revenue is o®set to a slightly
greater extent by future revenue reductions for small cities. Moreover, the response to an innovation in
grants di®ers by city size: in small cities, own revenues fall more, and expenditures rise less, as com-
pared to large cities. Generally speaking, however, the results concerning innovations in own-source and
intergovernmental revenue con¯rm the ¯ndings for the entire sample.
The situation is di®erent when it comes to innovations arising on the expenditure side. As reported in
the second column, small cities raise own revenue more in response to an innovation in expenditures than
18do large jurisdictions. For example, small jurisdictions respond to a permanent expenditure increase of
$1 with an increase in own revenue of about 67 cents, whereas large jurisdictions raise their own revenue
by only 38 cents. By contrast, large cities rely much more on transfers from higher-level governments to
¯nance permanent increases in expenditures. For small municipalities, only about 18 cents out of a dollar,
or 18 %, of a permanent increase in spending is ¯nanced by increased grants, whereas the corresponding
¯gure for large municipalities is almost 49%. It is interesting to compare these adjustment responses to
the average shares of expenditures ¯nanced by grants. Larger jurisdictions, on average, depend more
on grants: grants as a share of expenditures are 31% for large cities and only 26% for small cities. For
large cities, then, innovations in municipal expenditures are even more substantially ¯nanced by increased
intergovernmental transfers than the already higher average share of grants in total expenditures suggests.
Conversely, for smaller cities, innovations in municipal expenditures are even less substantially ¯nanced
through transfers than is indicated by the relatively low share of grants in total expenditures. Expressed
somewhat di®erently, the \marginal" response of grants to innovations in expenditures magni¯es the
existing \average" di®erential importance of grants in the ¯nances of cities in di®erent size categories.
The response of ¯scal transfers to an innovation in debt service is particularly noteworthy. We ¯nd that
small cities tend to respond by raising own revenue, whereas large cities do not. Instead, innovations in
debt service give rise to large increases in grants for large cities, where almost a third of the innovation is
o®set by transfers from higher-level governments. For other cities this response is negligible. Evidently,
grants play an unusually important role in the ¯scal adjustment process for large cities.
Taken together, these results suggest that our principal ¯ndings from Section 4 are robust with respect
to city size. Table 5's summary statistics about the ¯scal adjustment of municipalities in response to
¯scal shocks on the revenue side are essentially con¯rmed. On the expenditure side we do see, however,
some important di®erences. Expenditure and debt service innovations for large cities tend to be much
more o®set by intergovernmental transfers, whereas for small cities the main adjustment occurs through
changes in own revenues.
These di®erences in the dynamics of ¯scal adjustment for large and small cities cannot conclusively demon-
strate that large cities operate under soft budget constraints. They do, however, demonstrate that the
19¯scal adjustment process for large cities, especially in its intergovernmental dimensions, di®ers from that
for small cities, suggesting that the institutional structure of intergovernmental ¯scal relations also varies
by city size. One implication of this ¯nding is that empirical analysis of large cities, useful though it may be
because of their quantitative importance, may lead to ¯ndings that are unrepresentative of municipalities
in general.
6 Conclusion
The preceding analysis has investigated empirically the dynamic ¯scal policy adjustment of U.S. munic-
ipalities using a vector error-correction model which takes account of government intertemporal budget
constraints. The results point to an important role of expenditures in maintaining intertemporal budget
balance, especially in response to shocks in own-source and intergovernmental revenues. We ¯nd that
an additional dollar of own-source revenue gives rise to 78 cents of additional expenditures, expressed in
present value terms. In response to an additional dollar of grant revenue, expenditures rise by 64 cents, in
present value. However, revenue-side adjustments are signi¯cant, too; it is particularly interesting to note
that grants from higher-level governments are quite sensitive to municipal ¯scal imbalances. A sample
decomposition shows that these patterns are generally robust with respect to city size. However, it is
noteworthy that small cities tend to rely more on own-source revenue whereas additional revenue from
grants play a much larger role in restoring budget balance for large cities { much larger than the budget
share of grants in the ¯nances of these cities would suggest. Thus, intergovernmental transfers seem to
\cushion" the process of ¯scal adjustment for municipalities generally. Since municipalities use \external"
funds to balance their budgets, it is possible that this apparent softening of budget constraints distorts
local policy decisions. If so, our results suggest that this e®ect may be particularly relevant for larger
cities.
The statistical methods that we have used do not test for the importance of any particular institutional,
economic, or other determinants of municipal ¯scal adjustment, but rather shed light on the empirically-
relevant contours of the underlying institutions as revealed in the dynamic adjustment process. Our
20¯ndings have identi¯ed important empirical relationships, not previously discerned, the explanation of
which presents new challenges and opportunities for future research. For example, why should expenditures
and revenues play di®erent roles in the dynamic adjustment process for municipalities? Since expenditure
levels seem to be heavily in°uenced by changes in revenues, what does this imply about the impact of state-
level regulatory constraints on the types of revenue instruments available to municipalities, or limitations
on their utilization? Would these types of policies or institutional constraints have more signi¯cant impacts
on municipal spending than, say, budget oversight or review agencies which, at ¯rst glance, might appear
to be more directly related to expenditure policy? Why should intergovernmental transfers interact with
municipal ¯nances as they do? Why should ¯scal adjustment for large cities di®er from that of small cities?
As indicated in some of the preceding discussion, there are many interesting hypotheses that might be
examined in an attempt to explain these and other empirical results revealed in our analysis. An enhanced
view of the empirical landscape should be of value in discriminating among competing theoretical models
of local government policymaking in a federal structure, and, ultimately, in understanding better the
complex institutional structures, interacting with underlying economic, demographic, and technological
fundamentals, that produce the observed dynamic ¯scal adjustment process.
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